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After the dissolution of the Neoclassical theory as the exclusive reference paradigm in economics, 
various approaches have come to the forefront in the research in the economic field. Cognitive 
economics stands out from them,  being one of the most fertile. It is an interdisciplinary approach 
concerned with the following subjects: problem solving, choice and change in the explanation of 
economic transactions, the nature and evolution of organizations and institutions in a context 
characterized by structural uncertainty, scarcity and incentives. The economic agents’ behaviour has 
psycho-neurobiological foundations and is analyzed in the light of  bounded information, bounded 
and procedural rationality and satisfacing behaviour. Cognitive economics is contributing to a large 
spectrum of economic fields, such as consumer theory, economics of the firm, economics of 
innovation, evolutionary economics, institutional economics and experimental economics. 
This book illustrates the most recent developments in this field. 
The  aim of this introduction is twofold: supplying the reader with a general survey of the 
transversal subjects  dealt with in the various chapters; sorting out the future perspectives which can 
be already perceived  in this field of research. 
For the first point, we will refer to the key words of this book - cognition, evolution, learning, 
uncertainty and path-dependence – and we will analyze them in detail. As concerns the second 
purpose, this introduction will try to illustrate the “cognitive evolutionary approach”, which 
satisfactorily summarizes the future perspectives of cognitive economics, especially in the field of 
the analysis of endogenous change processes in dynamic economic systems.  2
From the point of view of its historical evolution, cognitive economics is certainly linked to the 
Cognitivist revolution of the 50’ (Rizzello 1999 ch.8); still, the development of this discipline has 
its own history. Alfred Marshall can be considered one of the founders of this approach, thanks to 
his views on the profound connection between the structure of organizations and the workings of 
the mind and the role and structure of the brain (Raffaelli 1994). In the XIX century an important 
role in the emergence of this approach was also played by Carl Menger and his views on the 
spontaneous nature and the role of social cement of norms, and on institutions seen as dependent on 
the limits of human mind  in handling all the complex environmental variables
1. Also Thorstein 
Veblen is to be mentioned among those who were aware of the connection between mental 
mechanisms, evolution and role of norms, as recently pointed out in a series of papers published on 
the Cambridge Journal of Economics (July 1998, Vol. 22, No. 4). The history of the XX century 
follows with its major representatives in this field: Hayek with his development of a model of mind 
aimed at explaining the role of bounded information and the nature of institutions in economic 
processes; Simon, who highlighted the connection between mental processes and the nature of 
human rationality and economic institutions; Boulding (1956), who shed light on the role of the 
image  in the production of knowledge on the part of individuals, and on its relevance in decision-
making and more generally in economic processes; Allais, Khaneman and Tversky and that relevant 
part of researchers in the field of experimental economics, who study individual and organizational 
learning processes and the processes of coordination of agents in a condition of uncertainty and 
bounded information, and who have stressed the limits of the expected utility theory and developed 
alternative theories. 
Moreover, in this field of research, we will mention the recent contributions of the agent-based 
simulation approach in economics (Luna and Perrone 2001), which are being developed along with 
the development of computer technology and of systems using artificial agents. Such contributions 
are more and more often proposing very interesting exchanges of ideas with experimental 
                                                           
1 These subjects were further dealt with by Hayek (Rizzello 1999).   3
economics. All these subjects will be dealt with in the following chapters. Coherent with its aims, 
this introduction is organized as follows: the first section deals with the connection between 
cognition and evolution. By integrating the cognitive and the evolutionary approach to economics, 
the main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the new self-organizing approach to explain 
the dynamics of change in economics is very relevant and compatible with cognitive economics. 
Section II concerns this relevance and presents economic systems as cybernetic ones. It introduces 
in economics the relatively new concepts of exaptation and neurognosis, used in biology and 
anthropology, which give us new tools to explain the nature and role of learning in evolution. 
Section III outlines the compatibility of this approach with the nature and workings of the mind. In 
particular, it describes the affinity of these concepts with Hayek’s psychological foundations of the 
concept of evolution.  As will emerge, all these processes are path-dependent. To this purpose, 
section IV describes path-dependence as resistance to change. This relatively new concept is 
compatible with Paul David’s and Brian Arthur’s idea of path-dependence, and it seems to be most 
appropriate in explaining evolutionary dynamics of self-organizing systems. Section V takes into 
consideration the relevance of this approach for organizational and institutional change.  Section VI 




I. Cognition and Evolution 
 
Cognition and evolution are two relevant features of economics. To support this point of view it is 
enough to consider that individual behavior is the analytical unit to understand economic systems, 
such as markets, organizations and institutions. Moreover, the latter are dynamic systems, 
characterized by feedback, change, time irreversibility and development. When considering 
individual behavior, it is very important to take into account what psychology and neurobiology  4
teach us. It is also relevant to model choice by taking into consideration how human mind works 
and which role is played by learning in decision making. Furthermore, to describe the dynamics of 
change, innovation and development of economic systems it is advisable to assume an evolutionary 
approach to economics.  
Whereas the evolutionary approach is emerging as an almost consolidate new strand, the 
cognitive perspective is relatively new in economics. In the first place it is necessary to point out 
that both – cognition and evolution – are two wide theoretical concepts, which tend to resist 
satisfactory definition. In fact, although a growing number of economists uses them, it is still 
possible to register different theoretical positions.  
Let us consider first of all evolutionary economics. After half century from its foundation 
(Alchian 1950), the evolutionary approach to economics presents today a very large spectrum of 
application. Gradually this paradigm – which was traditionally confined to explain the dynamics of 
competition from a Darwinian and Schumpeterian point of view - has been extended to many other 
ambits, the most relevant of which are endogenous change, path dependent dynamics, and 
organizational learning (Dosi 1991, Witt 1991, Dosi - Nelson 1994, Nelson 1995). It is not within 
the scope of this introduction to reconstruct the history of evolutionary economics. Yet it may be 
appropriate to shortly indicate the relevant passages of the development of evolutionary 
economics
2.  
Nelson’s and Winter’s (1982) book represents both one the most relevant contribution to the 
comprehension of the dynamics of change, and a bridge that links different analytical traditions. In 
fact, on the one hand, following Alchian’s (1950) seminal work, it clusters the Darwinian theory on 
natural selection and competition and the Schumpeterian ideas on technological change and 
economic dynamics. On the other hand, though it is mainly confined to the explanation of 
exogenous dynamics, this book contains analytical insights, which allows the integration of 
different tradition in the explanation of the dynamics of change.   
                                                           
2 Hodgson (1995 and 1999) offers a wide reconstruction of the history of evolutionary economics.   5
In the last decade of ‘900, it is not difficult to find many contributions stressing the 
relevance of endogenous and path-dependent dynamics for economic change. Yet some problems 
had to be coped with in order to reach such integration.  Next to Schumpeterian tradition, a new 
alternative approach arose. This can be synthesized as the Marshallian approach to economic 
change, stressing the relevance of endogenous change and self-organization analysis (Foster 1993 
and 1997; Hodgson 1997a; Foss 1997; Witt 1997)
3.  The latter rejects also the use of biological 
analogies and gives prominence to the fact that the interpretation of Schumpeter’s ideas on 
evolution is mainly a fruit of a misconception (Andersen 1997; Hodgson 1997b; Foster 2000). 
Self-organizing approach is very relevant for evolutionary economics, because economic 
systems are mainly time-irreversible and dissipative structures
4.  
Evolutionary analysis and cognitive economics should be integrated
5. 
Cognitive economics considers the relevance for economics of human cognitive aspects. In 
particular, it stresses that “economics implies choices. A choice is the result of psycho-
                                                           
3 Some authors try to integrate these two traditions. In particular, Silveberg – Dosi – Orsenigo (1988) maintained that 
competitive selection and self-organizing approach could coexist in a neo-schumpeterian model. But, as Foster pointed 
out (2000, p. 325), “they do not employ an economic self-organizing approach, in the sense of Schumpeter, but, rather, 
a more complex form of competitive selection”.  Following Foster (1994 and 2000), Schumpeter offers good insights to 
integrate competitive selection in a wider self-organizing approach. Schumpeter, in fact, conceives development and 
evolution as jointed process in the economic domain.  
4 Foster (1993) considers economic systems as dissipative structures, which usually have the peculiarity to be non-
equilibrium open systems (see Mori – Kuramoto 1998). In Prigogine’s conception dissipative structures are 
thermodynamic systems, “whose behavior is determined by its boundary conditions, in contrast to what he defines as a 
dynamic system which is determined by its initial condition” (Foster 1993, p. 985).   Economic systems are 
characterized also by time irreversibility, which differentiate them from mechanical models. Foster (1993, p. 982) 
proposes to revisit Marshall’s thought. “Marshall was all too aware that not evolutionary economics could be possible 
until time irreversibility was properly understand”.   Furthermore, Foss (1997), Foster (1993, in particular p. 976) and 
Hodgson (1999) stress the relevance of Marshall’ ideas on time irreversibility, which contrast with the economic 
mechanical paradigm, whose introduction in economics is erroneously addressed to Marshall. More generally, Witt 
(1991, p. 87) indicated in time irreversibility and in endogenous change two structural aspects of evolution.  
5 About the relevance of cognition for economics, the point of view here presented follows in particular the Austrian 
tradition on knowledge, creativity and novelty and it stresses their importance of these aspects for evolutionary 
economics, as Witt (1995 and 1999) pointed out.   6
neurobiological acts. The assumptions that are at the basis of economic theory, therefore, must be 
consistent with the mechanisms that guide the workings of the human mind” (Rizzello 1999, p. xv).   
A relevant part of heterodox literature presents a very interesting approach that stresses the 
relevance of mind’s workings in explaining economic behavior
6. Although one may think that the 
cognitive approach to economics is very recent, we can find some relevant contributions in the past, 
starting from the 1867 Marshall’s writings on the relevance of the mind to analyze organizations 
(Marshall 1867-8; 1961 [1871] Ch. IX)
7. Starting from Marshall’s early writings, this tradition has 
continued with the contributions of the Austrian school – Menger and Hayek in particular - on the 
subjectivist theory of perception, knowledge and cultural evolution (Menger 1883, Hayek 1937, 
1952, 1963, 1973, 1979). The ‘50s cognitive revolution integrated these theories with Simon’s 
works on rationality and Knight’s concept of structural uncertainty (Knight 1921, Simon 1957), and 
finally it allowed to integrate them in the behavioral economics of the firm (March-Simon 1958), 
the experimental economics approach to decision making (Kahneman – Tversky 1979), and the 
path-dependence literature on technological, organizational and institutional change (see 
respectively David 1985 and 1997, Antonelli 1999, Denzau-North 1993, Witt 1993).  
A common element in this literature is that the microfoundations of economic behavior are 
directly linked to the nature and role of the human mental mechanisms in charge of the production 
of knowledge and the emergence and use of rules, routines and their evolution. This point of view 
affects and tries to integrate both the neurobiological and the psychological human dimension, and 
learning is its analytical cornerstone. But learning represents also the main bridge between cognitive 
and evolutionary economics. 
                                                           
6 Rizzello (1999) offers, among other things, an overview of this literature.  
7 As Raffaelli (1994) suggests, Marshall’s account of the economic system (especially in Book IV of the Principles) 
was significantly influenced by his early encounters with problems of knowledge.  7
Learning is crucial, in fact, in understanding how people choose, but also in explaining how 
routines and rules emerge in an organizational and institutional context, and the way how the 
individual – environment feed-back occurs.   
 
II. Self-organization, neurognosis and exaptation.  
 
The self-organization approach is emerging as a new promising branch of evolutionary economics, 
which differs in some respects from the most traditional models of evolution, applied to economic 
change. By proposing a new point of view on evolution, such an approach seems able to answer 
some open relevant questions in evolutionary economics that invest the nature, role and dynamics 
of economic change. Such an approach is typical of time-irreversibility and dissipative structures in 
which change is not linear, and uncertainty, creativity and novelty matter.  The analytical 
foundations of time- irreversibility are based on the second law of thermodynamics (the principle of 
increasing entropy) that consider the capacity of the systems to acquire free energy and to promote 
structural evolution (Foster 1993, Hodgson 1995, Lesourne 1997, Witt 1997). Therefore, time-
irreversible systems are non-equilibrium open thermodynamics ones and they can be defined as 
dissipative structures which, in Prigoginean tradition, “are able to achieve a degree of ‘self-
organization’ (or autopoiesis) which enables them to export entropy and import free energy to 
maintain themselves” (Foster 1993, p. 185)
8. The evolutionary aspects of these systems rely on the 
fact that if these structures cannot reverse easily, they can only change by evolving.  
The self-organization approach presents a wide range of applicability that includes also 
socioeconomic systems, characterized by their informational rather than energetic nature. The most 
important units of analysis in economic systems are active agents and their intelligent nature, which 
produce knowledge (creativity) and informational flows.   8
From a very general point of view, the main question to be answered concerns how change 
happens. 
Usually, standard evolutionary economics presents two separated levels of analysis to 
explain change, i.e. an endogenous and an exogenous level. Most recently, evolutionary economists 
tried to integrate these levels (the first contributions in this direction are Silverberg-Dosi-Orsenigo 
1988, Lane 1993a and 1993b, Dosi – Kaniovsky 1994). The major tools used are directly borrowed 
from biology and consist mainly in evolution by means of natural selection (in a Darwinian or 
Lamarckian tradition). They use biological analogies to explain the relationship between agents (or 
firms) and environment, or to model the evolution of routines like genes
9.    
The point of view here presented considers the relevance of the internal dynamics of 
evolution of systems, as human beings, organizations and institutions. Because of their entropic and 
cybernetic nature, it is advisable to study the dynamics of these systems by means of new analytical 
tools like neurognosis and exaptation, which emerged in biology and anthropology.     
Because of their informational nature, economic systems are entropic. They produce, use 
and waste information.  Yet they are also cybernetic systems. The latter are characterized by their 
capacity to self-regulate and evolve in a mutable environment. This implies the presence of 
channels of communication, allowing the systems to react to changeability. Usually this happens by 
means of “negative feedback”
10.  This means that the organism is able to make an action, in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 Humberto Maturana coined the term “autopoiesis” about in 1960. Maturana and Varela use the term to refer to the 
fundamental process of living systems. Autopoiesis is essentially the mechanism by which living systems continually 
produce themselves as autonomous unities.  
9 The use of biological analogies in economics and the criticism of their use is a controversial issue. In the ’50s, 
Alchian’s (1950) paper primed a debate between Armen Alchian and Edith Penrose, who criticized the use of biological 
analogies (see Hodgson 1999 and Rizzello 2000). Rizzello (2000) reproposes to Nelson and Winter’s 1982 book some 
remarks of Penrose’s criticism to Alchian. For other criticism about the use of biological analogies in evolutionary 
economics see Mirowski (1983), Witt (1996 and 1999) and Foster (2000).    
10 As Boulding (1992) pointed out, next to classical cybernetics, characterized by negative feedbacks, creodic processes 
and positive feedbacks play an important role in evolutionary processes. A creodic process is typical of a system that 
evolves following a blueprint or a design. As a good example of creodic processes, one can consider the construction of 
a building or the evolution of an egg. Positive feedbacks work in the opposite way of the negative ones. Far from re- 9
opposite sense as respect to the external input. Many examples of this kind are easily found in living 
organisms, as well as in organizations and institutions.  The reference here is not only to the 
capacity to regulate the temperature of the body, for example, but also to some interesting 
psychological cybernetics mechanisms, which sometimes allow us to “deny the validity of 
information which is too upsetting to our identity or to our existing images of the world”, as 
suggests Boulding (1992, p. 289; see also Boulding 1956)
11.   
This aspect is particularly relevant. Human mind is in fact able to build images of the world 
allowing organisms to adapt them to changes. In the cognitive literature there is wide evidence that 
mind is the product of brain activity. And human brain can be easily described as a cybernetic 
structure. To describe how it works, it may be appropriate to explore how the mechanisms of 
perception, learning and adaptation work. The traditional answer that biology gives us (evolution by 
means of selection) is not completely satisfying. Certainly it is a good tool to explain how 
organisms adapt themselves to the changing environment, but it is not able to explain the 
functioning of the polarity between environmental adaptation and the protection of their internal 
integrity. Individuals do not simply “adapt” themselves to the changing environment, they resist, as 
long as possible, to these changes by interpreting and selecting external data in a way that results to 
be the most appropriate for their cognitive maps.    
If we take into consideration that evolution does not occur only by means of an adaptation 
mechanism, but that in the process of change and development the cognitive innate structures 
prevail
12, we can find a better answer by using the new analytical tools above mentioned. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
equilibrate systems, they increase the forces of disruption. Usually they concern the drastic and catastrophic changes 
and in referring to economic systems they can be utilized to describe, for example, technological crisis in schumpeterian 
terms.       
11 In literature this interesting aspect of human behavior is referred to as cognitive dissonance, which describes how 
people are emotionally averse to cognitive inconsistencies and seek to reduce them. Economics also offers some 
application of cognitive dissonance (for a shortly description see Rizzello 1999, pp. 80 - 81).  
12 Reber (1993, p. 148-9) emphasizes that the existence and the relevance of some forms of nativism in the development 
of mind/brain is almost uniformly recognized, and that no one today defends a pure empiricism in the sense of Locke’s 
tabula rasa.  10
Let us consider neurognosis. When an organism faces new information, its capacity to give 
significance to this information depends on its previously stored experience and on its innate 
neurognostic structures
13.  Experience, in fact, is the result of active interaction between associative 
structures  (neurobiological) and sensorial data. “The neural networks comprising the cognized 
environment have their developmental origin in initial neurognostic structures that are generally 
present before, at, or just after birth. The initial organization of neurognostic structures is primarily 
determined by the genotype”. Since our birth we are therefore structured to explore and model the 
world. The brain, at every moment, “imposes its relatively conservative order upon the experience it 
constructs” (Laughlin 1996, p. 365). The main characteristic of our brain is its capacity to evolve in 
a self-regulated way, including a degree of elasticity that allows it to explore, and interpret its world 
actively. Mental structures play a central role in the process of perception, and in that of giving 
significance and of constructing knowledge, and  neurognosis seems to be able to offer a good tool 
to explore this dimension. Human brain and mind evolve by following a path, that strongly depends 
on innate preexisting structures. Because of this dependence on its previous experiences and its 
innate structures, this can be clearly described as a path-dependent process. But it is important to 
stress that path-dependence emerges here more as a mechanism of resistance to change, rather than 
as a simple influence of the previous path on the development of organisms. Human mind tends to 
preserve itself, as much as possible, from change
14.  
                                                           
13 The notion of neurognosis is linked to the idea that knowledge is constructed in cognitive frameworks. This aspect is 
not new at all in the literature on organization and management of “absorptive capacity” (see Cohen and Levinthal 
1990). From this perspective, firms have been theorized as “sensemaking systems”, “focusing device”, “systems of 
shared meanings” (Smircich 1983, Weick and Roberts 1993, Weick 1995, Choo 1998, Nooteboom 1999).  
In this context it is interesting to point  out that this idea of mental mechanisms seen in path-dependent  terms as a 
resistance  to change is quite similar to the theory of personality of George Kelly, which  was based on the idea that  
interpretative systems  are resistant to change and might be overwhelmed by major departures from familiar 
circumstances.   11
In the evolution of nervous systems a double mechanism works simultaneously: path-
dependence and feed back. The brain collects external stimuli and the mind gives them significance. 
The  brain associates the new stimuli by following its structures and it continuously tries to verify – 
by means of a feed back mechanism – the reliability of its classification. The mind gives 
significance to the stimuli it receives by using feed back and path dependence.   
The arising question at this point is: which is the mechanism that can explain how brain and 
organisms evolve? We can find the answer in considering exaptation. 
The term exaptation was coined by biologists to design the situations in which evolutionary 
systems discover new uses for old inventory (Varela 1979, Gould – Vbra 1982, Gould 1991).  This 
happens when organisms become able to use, for a novel function, something which arose for some 
other reasons
15. Following Gould, major innovations in evolution are all fruit of an exaptation 
process. “The human brain is, par excellence, the chief exemplar of exaptation” (Gould 1991, 55). It 
continuously builds models of world and of itself and, in doing so, new neuronal structures emerge, 
in order to give significance to the sensorial data from old ones. Exaptation is not predictable 
because it is an act of co-optation for the new function of something which evolved for different 
reasons.    
Apparently exaptation is irreconcilable with neurognosis.  The latter, in fact, stresses the 
relevance of innate structures in explaining evolution. The former does not consider innatisme 
explicitly and it does not clearly underline the role of path dependence.  But the point of view here 
proposed supports these two analytical categories as complementary, by presenting Hayek’s idea of 
evolution, selection and change.  Hayek’s surprising concept of evolution has psycho-
                                                           
15 A famous example in this literature concerns penguins’ wings. Usually wings arose  in birds in the context of flight, 
but it was an exaptation process that conferrd advantages to penguins in swimming (Gould – Vrba 1982).  12




III. Hayek’s psycho-neurobiological concept of evolution 
 
Although the interpretation of Hayek’s ideas on cultural evolution and group selection is still a 
controversial issue among his scholars (Caldwell 2000, Witt 2000), there is wide evidence that by 
means of this concept he refers to how learnt rules, group norms of conduct, habits, routines and 
institutions emerge and evolve. Furthermore, the role played by human mind’s nature and limits 
appears evident in Hayek’s conception of evolution of rules and institutions. Very shortly, we can 
state that rules of conduct, habits and routines emerge from the human limits in interpreting the very 
complex external world. Following rules and codifying them in institutions is an “economic way” to 
act successfully. Rules and organic institutions, in fact, standardize the world and in so doing they 
simplify the ambit in which humans use their limited cognitive capacity. 
In the last decade a growing number of scientific contributions stressed the relevance of 
Hayek’s book on psycho-neurobiology, which for many years was neglected by scholars. The 
Sensory Order was conceived by Hayek in the 20’s but published only thirty years later. The late 
acknowledgement of the relevance of this book permits today to revisit some central concepts of 
Hayek’s thought
17. As he stressed many times, The Sensory Order is a cornerstone to understand 
Hayek’s thought on knowledge, competition and cultural evolution (Hayek 1979, pp. 199 – 200, 
and Hayek 1994).  
                                                           
16 This problem is linked to another well-known problem in organizational literature, that of combining “exploitation 
and exploration” (March 1991). 
17 In  two recent papers Caldwell (2000) and Horwitz (2000) underlined once more the relevance of The Sensory Order 
for the understanding of Hayekian conception of evolution and for the spontaneous construction  of  a liberal order, 
respectively. Caldwell, in particular, describes the centrality of this book in the emergence of Hayek’s ideas on  13
It may be appropriate to illustrate in this part a brief summary of the model of mind we can 
found in his book
18.  
          In Hayek’s conception, mind is a framework that orders perception through acts of 
interpretation. The human neuronal structure classifies external sensorial data by means of a process 
of association of classes of stimuli into classes of responses. The significance that we give to each 
perception depends upon the genetic characteristics of the individual and upon his/her previous 
activity of classifications of external stimuli (experience). The mind does not receive sensations in a 
passive way. On the contrary, it is an active tool that interacts with external environment. Not only. 
The mind continuously builds an image of itself and of the world and rebuilds them in a tacit and 
unconscious way.  
     This image of itself and of the world is the framework that allows us to give significance, by 
means of personal and idiosyncratic interpretation, to external information. More important, this 
allows us to construct knowledge, that is a fruit of an internal and subjectivist process, which we 
use to act. Being based on the person's genetic traits and on his/her personal experiences, every 
person acts after performing a process of "interpretation" of the external (objective) information, 
which he transforms into subjective knowledge, which is unique and original. Through a learning 
process that takes place over the years, in turn, genetic traits and personal experiences continuously 
redesign the neuronal circuitries that represent our imagine of ourselves and of the external world, 
depending on both personal activities and the action of innate bioregulatory circuitries. This 
mechanism explains how brains assure the polarity between environmental adaptation and the 
protection of its internal integrity.   
      As is emerging, neurognosis and exaptation are evident in Hayek’s conception of the human 
brain.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
evolution, demonstrating the link between human mind and role of cultural evolution (on this issue see also Rizzello 
2000, and Rizzello- Turvani 2000). 
18 A larger description of these contents can be found in Rizzello 1999.   14
      The evolution of the mind – i.e. the evolution of our capacity to build and process images and 
symbols to generate knowledge – happens, in fact, by means of a balance between ontogenesis and 
phylogenesis. Starting from its native structures, brain evolves by building new nervous circuitries. 
They result from the feedback with the relatively inelastic  (but not completely rigid) nature of our 
a-priori mental schemes which interpret external information in a path-dependent way. This 
interpretation is carried out by means of exaptation. In other words, previous neuronal structures 
built and developed to solve problems of interpretations of external world effectively, reveal their 
capacity to co-opt new configurations and functions when individual faces new problems
19. After 
this process, these latter result, in turn, modified and they are ready to co-opt new unfamiliar 
external data and so on.          
       Some cerebral circuitries remain stable, and the brain builds up its balance between stable and 
unstable circuitries. When faced with a problematic new situation, individuals generally refer to 
previous successfully experimented schemas of action that permit to read the new phenomena 
accordingly (Butos – Koppl 1997). Classification through individual association of stimuli leads to 
interpretative outcomes and action, which can vary greatly from an individual to another. At any 
given point in an individual's life, a great part of his cerebral circuits is personal and unique, since it 
reflects his genetic characteristics, and the history and events of that particular organism (Witt 1992, 
Vanberg 1994, Ch. 6), which is also the result of the interactive process which takes place – by 
means of exaptation and feedback - with his/her cultural and social context (Hayek 1963).  
     Therefore, Hayek emphasizes the importance of the connection between the evolution of the 
mind and the evolution of institutions. Even if it is not in the purposes of this  introduction  to 
consider the controversial debate on Hayek’s concept of evolution, it is certainly worth pointing out 
that this particular conception - so strongly linked to the role and function of mind seen as a self-
regulating mechanism - seems to be a useful tool to extend the analysis of the evolution of self-
organization structures.    
                                                           
19 Gould (1991) has stressed the relevance of exaptation for evolutionary psychology.   15
All these aspects of Hayek’s thought are, in fact, surprisingly coherent with the biological 
and anthropological micro-foundations of the analysis of self-regulating systems. This represents a 
good reason to make an attempt to integrate this “evolutionary” literature with the cognitive 
tradition and in particular with Hayek’s ideas. To this purpose, we need to make two more steps. 
Since path-dependence seems to play a crucial role for understanding these processes, the first step 
concerns the explanation of how path-dependent analysis is coherent both with Hayek’s ideas and 
with the neurognostic biological tradition. The second one consists in illustrating the new 
perspectives of economics of the firm and institutional economics introduced by this approach. 
 
IV. Path-dependence in human cognition 
 
Path-dependence is a relevant analytical tool for economic theory. In the last couples of decades, a 
growing literature has dealt with this topic. It is not in the bounds of this introduction to propose a 
review of this interesting literature. But, in spite of the unconvincing criticisms by Lebowitz and 
Margolis (1995)
20, it is possible to make an attempt to summarize in few sentences the main points 
introduced by this literature into economics.  
Two basic ideas are central in path-dependence: (i) history matters in determining the dynamics of 
social and economic processes; (ii) the passage from a state to another of an economic system 
depends on the previous paths.  
The first idea conveys the principle that historical events (even small ones) condition the 
system’s evolution with some rigidities that the economic action can modify only in part. The 
second one stresses the aspect that the outcome of a path-dependent process is not foreseeable at all. 
The final equilibrium reached by the system can be a sub-optimal one. As David and Arthur 
demonstrated, the path of dynamic systems depends on a stochastic and self-reinforcing mechanism 
that usually conducts to “lock-in” the system into a trapping region, i.e. the basin of attraction that 
                                                           
20  See also Paul David’s reaction to the criticism by Leibowitz and Margolis (David 1997).  16
surrounds a locally (or globally) stable equilibrium
21. These kinds of equilibrium are stable but not 
(necessarily) optimal and they often result to be multiple ones.  
A relevant aspect that is usually neglected in this literature is that the early mechanism of 
path-dependence is founded in the human brain (Rizzello 1997). The dynamics of economic 
systems depend, in fact, on the interaction among individuals and on their choices. The latter 
depend on the way how agents acquire information and produce and use knowledge. This is a 
crucial process for economic theory, as Hayek clearly supported. Moreover, it is coherent with the 
idea that economic systems (from individual to institutional dimensions) are cybernetic and 
neurognostic. Not only. If we assume the central role of human mind and brain to explain economic 
processes, exaptation become a better tool to explain how these systems evolve. Let us explain this 
point in depth.  
Following Hayek’s insights and the more recent neurobiological and cognitive teachings
22, 
we can note that human brain presents a particular pre-natal structure allowing it to interpret and 
give significance to the external world. This neuronal structure evolves by means of exaptation in 
classifying new external stimuli in its preexisting nets. The actions which can solve problematic 
situations successfully are interpreted as satisficing (in Simon’s sense) choices. They depend at least 
on four aspects: the genetic neurobiological dimension of the individual; his/her previous 
experience; historical stochastic accidents; the feed-beck with the environment.  
It is easy to picture the brain as a neurognostic mechanism which tries to perceive external 
data by balancing its pre-existing neuronal structure, so as to interpret and use the new stimuli 
effectively. The interpretation of external stimuli generates an action. If this is successful - in 
satisficing terms -, it reinforces the perception mechanism that reduces the neurobiological elasticity 
                                                           
21 “When a dynamical economic system enters such a region, it cannot escape except through the intervention of some 
external force, or shock, that alters its configuration or transforms the underlying structural relationships among the 
agents” (David 1997, p.  34).  17
to interpret (to exapt) in a different way the same situation when it recurs. Or, in other words, it 
increases the resistance to change of our (neurognostic) brain.  This mechanism of perception and 
feedback is coherent with the “lock-in” idea. But, whereas usually path-dependence literature refers 
in general this mechanism to economic systems, the point of view supported here is to extend the 
idea of the “trapping states” to individual decision-making, starting from the brain’s processes of 
perception and mind’s mechanisms of representation. The image of the external and internal world, 
which each individual constructs, depends both on his/her innate neurobiological perceiving 
structures and on the evolution of these structures that exapt themselves following previous 
experiences.  
The fact that the evolution of the brain is path-dependent means that it certainly depends on 
its history, but also on its neurognostic structure, which in turn resists to continuous changes. The 
image of the self and the external world tends to preserve the previous one, as long as possible. In a 
sense, neuronal structures have a conservative nature, but they are not completely rigid. 
As is emerging, when brain processes information and produces knowledge, it acts in a 
dimension characterized by structural uncertainty. It clusters four kinds of uncertainty that we can 
summarize as follow: human genetic features are stochastic; previous experiences are idiosyncratic; 
historical accidents are not forecasting; successful feed-back processes depend on the combination 
of the other three levels and interindividual communication takes place thanks to a common 
institutional framework, education, language and rules of conduct that individuals shared.  
 
V. Evolution and organizational and institutional change  
 
Up to now, we are referring this model to decision-making processes, which combine 
Hayek’s view on perception and knowledge, the tradition on path-dependence, and the new 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
22 For a complete overview, see Wilson and Keil 1999. Liepert et al. (2000) offer, among other things, an empirical 
confirmation of the neuronal plasticity, of the continuous transformation and reorganization of the brain, and of its  18
biological conception of evolution. Still it might be possible to extend its applicability to 
organizational and institutional levels. The latter are the object of a wide literature on path-
dependence and evolution. It might be fruitful to consider, in industrial and institutional economics, 
the dynamics of change as characterized by exaptation, taking into account, for example, that 
innovation depends both on a firm’s history and on its resistance to change. Or, similarly, the 
evolution of institutions as linked to history paths and also to cultural rigidities.   
On the industrial economic side, this idea could improve the models of the creation and 
control of demand by the firm, proposing a different and integrating point of view as compared to 
the literature that stresses in particular exogenous change. As Momigliano (1975) stressed 25 years 
ago, firms not only meet existing needs, they also create new ones. Research, innovations and 
inventions become more and more important within production processes. This view implies a 
concept of the competition process in which firms, instead of meeting the needs arising on the 
demand side, try to “frame” the market ad to create their own demand artificially.  Such strategies 
are strongly dependent on the firm’s specific characteristics and on its role on the market, its 
organizational structure, its history, previously adopted strategies, on how quickly it can get access 
to credit, on the process of learning in the use of scientific research and also on positive externalities 
due to economic policy.  In other words, Momigliano proposes  a (self-organizing) model of 
innovation and development of dynamic structuralism (Antonelli 1995), stressing the relationship 
between firm’s structure, characteristics of the economic system it works within, and its 
performance.  
As regards the institutional side, the above proposal could further reinforce the models that 
consider the link between mind and institutions, in explaining institutional change (Hayek 1942, 
Denzau-North 1994, Rizzello-Turvani 2000 and 2002). Or more generally it could represent a step 
to explain further the relevance of endogenous dynamics in the evolution of economic systems, by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
physiological sensibility to the experience.  19
offering the new concept of evolution proposed by Hayek  and different from that of Nelson and 
Winter (Rizzello 2000).  
Stressing the role of evolution in human mind and brain and the link between mental 
mechanism and the emergence and nature of rules and institutions, Hayek gives us a model of 
evolution in which both ontogenesis and phylogenesis played a balanced role. In this light, the 
evolutionary cognitive approach could fill in the gap between the cognitive individual dimension 
and the holistic one. Let us consider this aspect very briefly. 
As suggested above, individual cognitive maps evolve by exaptation. But it is relevant to 
consider also that it mainly happens in a “cultural” context. From a cognitive point of view, culture 
is an ensemble of representations shared by all the members of a group. This kind of representations 
is not “perfectly” shared, because what individuals share are not mental facts but an 
“epidemiological” distribution of casually linked mental and public facts in a human population 
(Sperber – Hirschfeld 1999, p. cxxii). Human cognitive dispositions allow individuals to adopt 
spontaneously cultural representations that are reinforced by previously acquired institutional 
constraints
23. Because of the neurognostic structure of their brain and their ability to exapt, humans 
continuously evolve by both resisting to change and by adopting changes. Moreover, cognitive 
processes, involved in most relevant activity, do not take place just in one single mind but they are 
distributed throughout many members.  
Since there is still a very big  open problem in neoinstitutional literature, this could be a 
simple suggestion to address further developments. 
 
                                                           
23 The social cognitive learning theory (Bandura 1986) seems to offer good analytical tools in understanding the 
behavioral foundation of cultural evolution, as suggested by Witt (2000) and Rizzello-Turvani 2002.    20
VI. Concluding remarks  
 
With reference to the key words of this book, one the main purposes of this introduction was to 
stress the relevance of the integration of the cognitive approach to change and decision-making in 
evolutionary economics with particular reference to self-organizing models. By introducing the 
concepts of neurognosis and exaptation it has tried to show that a unifying mechanism of evolution 
exists at every level of analysis, and it reinforces the idea that economic systems evolve in path-
dependent terms.  
The introduction did not supply a wide discussion on all the aspects concerning evolutionary 
economics (as the reader will gain a good knowledge of them in the following chapters). On the 
contrary, it focused on the microfoundations of evolutionary dynamics.  
By doing so, it has tried to show the affinity of this approach - which tries to combine 
neurognosis, exaptation and path-dependence - whit the neuropsychological foundations of Hayek’s 
conception of evolution.  
Summing up, the self-organization approach to evolutionary economics seems to be 
particularly relevant in explaining endogenous change. The point of view here proposed analyzed 
the cognitive aspects of this approach and some evolutionary implications. Following Hayek’s 
insights, it is time to go beyond the endogenous/exogenous dichotomy, taking into account the 
views which biology, anthropology and psychology propose on the same issues. 
In such an interdisciplinary perspective, cognitive evolutionary economics seems to offer 
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